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The Web of Data (WoD) is to computers what the tra-
ditional Web is to humans. The goal is to expose data in
a semantic format such that machines can easily find the
information they are looking for. If implemented properly, a
semantic search would lead to the desired results much faster
than using a traditional search engine. However, a big prac-
tical challenge is the adoption of WoD technologies (Anto-
niou and van Harmelen, 2004). In particular, the majority of
data is not available in a suitable WoD format. The primary
reason for this is a lack of incentives for data providers: the
WoD is usually queried via algorithms rather than browsed
by people and thus, advertising, the main source of income
for search engines on the traditional web, does not work.
It is of course possible to directly charge users to search
through high-quality data. For example, Bloomberg, Lexis-
Nexis, and Thomson Reuters charge customers high fees for
accessing their data. However, none of these companies pro-
vide the means to join multiple data sets, thereby forgoing
the complementarities the WoD would enable. To address
this shortcoming, we suggest using a market which allows
buyers to benefit from complementary data sources while
providing incentives to sellers to adopt WoD technologies.
Concretely, we propose to use a double auction, designed
to provide market participants with good incentives to re-
veal their values and costs such that we can make (approxi-
mately) efficient allocations. Interestingly, in our domain, it
is non-trivial to find a payment rule that satisfies the partici-
pation constraint (all participants have non-negative utility)
and the budget-balance constraint (payments made by the
buyers are equal to the payments received by the sellers).
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The main complicating feature of our domain is that the
sellers are selling their data instead of just computational re-
sources. While the sellers can provide some statistics about
their data, it is impossible to know a priori what data is
available to answer a specific query, because this would re-
quire running the whole query and incurring the full costs.
Thus, there is uncertainty about which goods exist in the
market, and this may sometimes lead to inefficient alloca-
tions. If not handled properly, these inefficient allocations
can make the payment rule infeasible because the partici-
pation constraint and the budget balance constraint may be
violated. For example, the Threshold rule (Parkes et al.,
2001), a classic double auction which always satisfies partic-
ipation and budget-balance in a domain without uncertainty,
is not guaranteed to work in our domain.
Our Contributions
1. We propose the“Query Market,”a double auction mech-
anism for querying the WoD.
2. We show that the Threshold rule does not work in our
domain due to the uncertainty about the sellers’ data.
3. We introduce three payment correction rules to de-
sign payment rules that always satisfy the participation
constraint despite the uncertainty in our domain.
4. We evaluate the efficiency of the three payment rules
via a computational Bayes-Nash equilibrium analysis
(Lubin et al., 2015) for multiple market scenarios.
We compare the performance of our new payment rules in
a domain with uncertainty to the performance of the Thresh-
old rule in a domain without uncertainty. We find that our
rules provide similar incentives and achieve similar efficiency
as Threshold, despite the additional challenge of having to
deal with the uncertainty about the sellers’ data. Further-
more, we show that even our rules cannot guarantee budget
balance due to the occasional inefficient allocations, but we
demonstrate that the average amount of deficit is small.
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